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ABSTRACT 
The goal of this thesis is to present how Brazilian law treats terrorism. In particular, it 
seeks to develop a model bearing the core characteristics that an effective criminal law 
must have to fit the country’s reality. We intend to conduct a thorough critical analysis of 
the current law, and present the requirements to design an adequate one. Therefore, the 
study path starts with an overview of Law 7170/83, which allegedly criminalizes 
terrorism in Brazil.  
Next, we will show how international laws and agreements signed by Brazil 
obligate the country to have a law against terrorism. Finally, the text will show that 
adoption of a criminal law is one of the several approaches to dealing with terrorism and 
how civil liberties can be affected by the decision to criminalize such acts. In this context, 
and to show foreign experiences, we will use the comparative method to study the 
experience of six countries regarding criminal law dealing with terrorism: Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, Peru, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain, and Northern Ireland.  
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The theme of this thesis was chosen because of the issues that have arisen during 
my own experience as a federal police commissioner. Several times in my career, I have 
seen and have been briefed by colleagues about the consequences of the weakness in the 
criminal law field. In some cases, we did not have the support of the law to interrupt acts 
that we knew were happening in our country. In other situations, I have witnessed cases 
where people were arrested on strong evidence, but the court released them because the 
interpretation was that an anti-terrorism law1 did not exist in Brazil.2 I am talking about 
serious crimes with consequences beyond the borders of Brazil.3 
The goal of this thesis is to present how Brazilian law treats terrorism. In 
particular, it seeks to develop a model bearing the core characteristics that an effective 
criminal law must have to fit the country’s reality. For this purpose, it is important to 
understand the debate as to whether such a criminal law already exists. Furthermore, if 
one does, but it is ineffective, we will discuss what the consequences could be for the 
counter-terrorism system. In fact, we intend to conduct a thorough critical analysis of the 
current law, and present the requirements to design an adequate one. Therefore, the study 
path starts with an overview of Law 7170/83,4 which allegedly criminalizes terrorism in 
Brazil. For this purpose, we present the historical context, and changes brought about by 
the new Federal Constitution in 1988,5 and analyze the decisions of the Brazilian 
Supreme Court6 about the respective law.  
                                                 
1 Brazilian Federal Government, “Legislacao/Leis Ordinarias” [Legislation/Law] 
http://www.planalto.gov.br. 
2 Veja Magazine, “Exclusivo: Documentos da CIA, FBI e PF Mostram Como Age a Rede do Terror 
Islamico no Brasil” [Exclusive: Documents from CIA, FBI and FP Show How the Islamic Network Work 




4 Brazilian Federal Government,” Legislacao/Lei 7170/83” [Legislation/Law 7170/83], trans. Carlos 
H. Oliveira de Sousa http://www.planalto.gov.br. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Brazilian Supreme Court, “Informativo/Pesquisa” [Informative/Research], trans. Carlos H. Oliveira 
de Sousa http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/principal/principal.asp. 
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Next, we will show how international laws and agreements signed by Brazil7 
obligate the country to have a law against terrorism. Finally, the text will show that 
adoption of a criminal law, with some characteristics, is one of several approaches to 
dealing with terrorism and how civil liberties can be affected by the decision to 
criminalize such acts. In this context, and to show foreign experiences, we will use the 
comparative method to study the experience of six countries regarding criminal law 
dealing with terrorism: Argentina, Colombia, Peru, the United States of America, and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In this step, the objective is to 
understand the costs and benefits of the adoption of such a criminal law in the selected 
countries. 
The focus of the thesis is on what Brazil needs to do in order to improve its 
counter-terrorism law in the light of the following reasons: 1) the current law is not well 
defined; 2) it does not fulfill the requirements of the international treaties; and 3) the 
courts do not recognize it as a current law. The challenge in this work is to develop the 
core characteristics that a criminal law must have to fulfill the Brazilian reality. At the 
same time, this model must not affect civil liberties. 
The main question is which criminal legal model best fits the Brazilian reality? To 
answer this question, first we need to address other questions: Does Brazil already have a 
criminal law regarding terrorism? In case of an attack, what, according to the Brazilian 
legal system, would the penalties be for the terrorist? How is Brazil engaged in the global 
system against terrorism, and what are its responsibilities and duties? Could criminal law 
provide an effective solution to prevent and combat terrorism? 
                                                 
7 Brazilian Federal Government, “Legislacao/Leis” [Legislation/Laws], trans. Carlos H. Oliveira de 
Sousa, http://www.planalto.gov.br. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND ENVIRONMENT 
The United Nations Security Council has played an important role, publishing 
Resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001, urging all member states to criminalize terrorist 
acts.8 Despite the lead from the U.N. during the aftermath of 9/11, the aforementioned 
Resolution did not actually define terrorism. Therefore, it was left to each country to 
decide how the law would treat the theme. In this scenario, a scholar stated, “each nation 
was then to define terrorism according to its own history, objectives, and concerns.”9 
Thus, it is crucial to understand Brazil’s particular structure for dealing with terrorism. 
Despite the fact that Brazil has no history of terrorist attacks and enjoys a 
reputation for good relations on the international political scene, we cannot underestimate 
the possibility of an attack, mainly in view of the significant changes that have been 
taking place in the global scenario. Although the possibility of a terrorist attack is low, 
there is always a possibility of preparing, financing, or supporting terrorist activities from 
Brazil. At this point, it seems that Brazil fits the author’s words, “the trend in many 
countries is for terrorism-specific laws that target remote acts of preparation and planning 
that would not be caught by general offences of attempts, conspiracy, or incitement.”10 It 
must also be mentioned that in the 1960s and 1970s, during the military dictatorship, 
Brazil experienced the emergence of a counter-revolutionary movement11 involving 
paramilitary groups with characteristics similar to those of terrorists.  
The terrorist acts committed by the above-referenced insurgent groups in Brazil in 
the recent past were cited in doctrinaire studies as examples of innovation. According to 
                                                 
8 United Nations Organization, “Resolution 1373 (2001).” 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1373(2001). 
9 Victor V. Ramraj et al., eds., Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 4. 
10 Ibid., 114. 
11 Elio Gaspari, As Ilusoes Armadas Vol. 1 [The Armed illusions] A Ditadura Envergonhada [The 
Ashamed Dictatorship], trans. Carlos H. Oliveira de Sousa (Sao Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), 252. 
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Martha Crenshaw,12 “the development of diplomatic kidnappings began with the 
Brazilian revolutionary movement in 1968, and was adopted by the Uruguayan 
Tupamaros in their shift to the urban guerrilla.” Innovation is the keyword in this text, not 
in the sense used by Professor Martha Crenshaw in the aforementioned text, but in the 
current use of the term. A terrorist attack in Brazil during the mega sporting events would 
be classified as a form of innovation in terms of the local reality. 
It is important to highlight a statement from an authority that deals with terrorism 
investigation in Brazil. According to Brazilian Federal Police Director of Intelligence 
Daniel Lorenz, during a Public Security Commission hearing in the Deputy Chamber, 
where the theme of terrorism was presented:13  
Previously, extremists passing through the country used it as a staging 
post. Then, they began to adopt prostitutes’ children in order to be able to 
remain in the country. After, they proceeded to indoctrinate Brazilians 
with their radical rhetoric. Now, using the country as a base, they are 
preparing to launch attacks against targets abroad. 
Currently, terrorism is a theme under debate in Brazil because of the major events 
that the country held in 2014—(the FIFA World Cup,) and, will hold in 2016—(the 
Summer Olympic Games). The country hosted the World Cup between June 12 and July 
13, 2014. It was one of the biggest events on the planet, and the number of tourists, both 
Brazilian and foreign, was almost 3.7 million.14 It was forecasted that, worldwide, more 
than 1 billion people watched the matches via the broadcast media.15 In addition, it is 
estimated that the Olympics, to be held in June 2016, will attract 4.5 billion spectators 
around the world.16 
                                                 
12 Martha Crenshaw, “Innovation: Decision Points in the Trajectory of Terrorism.” prepared for the 
Conference on “Trajectories of Terrorist Violence in Europe,.” Minda de Gunzburg Center for European 
Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, March 9–11, 2001. 
13 Paulo Roberto de Almeida, “1350 Brasil com Base de Apoio ao Terrorismo Islamico” [Brazil as a 
Base to the Islamic Terror], trans. Carlos H. Oliveira de Sousa, Blog Diplomatizzando, 
http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2009/09/1350-brasil-como-base-de-apoio-ao.html. 
14 Brazilian Federal Government, “2014 FIFA World Cup.” http://www.copa2014.gov.br. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Organizing Committee for the Olympic and Paralympic Games Rio 2016 “2016 Olympic Games.” 
http://www.rio2016.org.br. 
 5
Brazil still has not clarified the doubt regarding the existence of a criminal law 
addressing terrorism.17 This constitutes an extremely sensitive point for a nation that 
intends to perform an important role as a regional leader. Besides the major events it will 
host, Brazil is facing the consequences of globalization and preparing for the new 
challenges on the horizon. In this regard, terrorism is one of the principal themes, and its 
consequences reach beyond country borders. Only through concerted effort among 
nations is it possible to construct barriers to contain this growing phenomenon. For this 
reason, it is necessary for the country to prepare clear responses in advance. A lack of 
definition on the legal aspect of the theme only increases the legal insecurity. It is 
important to discuss the scenario expected in the country over the coming years, 
especially with regard to the aforementioned mega-events. 
Brazil is not well prepared to deal with terrorism, especially because of the 
controversy concerning whether there exists a criminal law against terrorism. The focus 
of this thesis is to develop a criminal law model that best matches the Brazilian reality. 
Thus, we began by researching the existence of criminal law addressing terrorism, how 
such law may affect civil liberties, and the legal and security system of the country. 
A. MAIN THEORIES 
There are several kinds of counter-terrorism approaches. One of them is passing 
legislation with the aim of fighting terrorism.18 According to Kent Roach,19 “the criminal 
law can play a unique role in exposing, denouncing, and punishing terrorism, but it 
should only be one element in a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy.” At this point, a 
controversial debate arises: first, if such a law actually exists in Brazil, and secondly, 
regarding the focus on the consequences for the constitutional rights or civil liberties. The 
                                                 
17 Paulo de Tarso Resende Paniago, “Legislacao Brasileira Especifica Sobre Terrorismo e os Grandes 
Eventos Internacionais” [Brazilian Specific Legislation About Terrorism and the Major Events], trans. 
Carlos H. Oliveira de Sousa, SAGRES Politica e Gestao Estrategica Integradas Organization website, 
http://sagres.org.br/legislacao-brasileira-especifica-sobre-terrorismo-e-os-grandes-eventos-internacionais/. 
18 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2011), 75. 
19 Ramraj et al., eds., Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, 93. 
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Brazilian Federal Constitution,20 promulgated in 1988, addresses the theme of terrorism, 
putting it in the spotlight in a very important chapter that deals with individual and 
collective rights and duties. Articles 421 and 522 read (in part) as follows: 
Article 4: The international relations of the Federative Republic of Brazil are 
governed by the following principles: VIII—repudiation of terrorism and racism. 
Article 5: XLIII—the practice of torture, the illicit traffic of narcotics and related 
drugs, as well as terrorism, and crimes defined as heinous crimes shall be considered by 
law as non-bailable, and not subject to grace or amnesty, and their principals, agents, and 
those who omit themselves while being able to avoid such crimes shall be held liable. 
Although the Brazilian Federal Constitution placed the theme of terrorism on a 
par with other very important chapters, the legislators did not in fact attribute it the same 
weight.23 
Before beginning to present the discussion on the theme under Brazilian criminal 
law, it is important to stress that, in the Brazilian legal system, a law is required to be in 
accordance with the Constitution for it to have validity/efficacy.24 In this case, Brazilian 
legal doctrine defines two situations for laws to be compatible with the 1988 Federal 
Constitution: those that were devised at a date prior to its promulgation, and those that 
were devised subsequent to its promulgation. The laws that were created in the pre-1988 
period underwent a process of acceptance in relation to the new constitutional order. This 
meant that the content of the law had to be in full accordance with the principles and 
basic tenets set forth in the Constitution. If the law did not obey this requirement, the 
jurists stated that the law was not accepted by the new juridical order established after 
                                                 
20 Brazilian Federal Government, “Constituicao Federal de 1988” [1988 Brazilian Constitution], trans. 
Carlos H. Oliveira de Sousa, http://www.planalto.gov.br. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Marcello Ovidio Lopes Guimaraes, Tratamento Penal do Terrorismo [Criminal Treatment of 
Terrorism], trans. Carlos H. Oliveira de Sousa (Sao Paulo: Quartier Latin, 2007), 83. 
24 Luiz Roberto Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro [The Constitutional 
Judicial Review in Brazilian Law], trans. Carlos H. Oliveira de Sousa (Sao Paulo: Saraiva, 2012), 7. 
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this Constitution.25 In this case, the law was no longer valid or efficacious. Under the 
second hypothesis, when a law was promulgated at a date after 1988, it was examined 
and considered constitutionally valid if it obeyed the parameters established by the 
Constitution. Otherwise, it was declared unconstitutional and, therefore, without validity 
or efficacy.26 
Law 7.170,27 promulgated in 1983, was denominated Lei de Seguranca Nacional 
[National Security Law], Article 20,28 which stated the following: 
Article 20: Devastate, loot, extort, rob, kidnap, illegally imprison, commit 
arson, vandalize, cause explosion, commit an assault or act of terrorism 
due to political inconformity or for the acquisition of funds aimed at the 
maintenance of clandestine or subversive political organizations. Penalty: 
imprisonment for 3–10 years. 
In principle, it would seem crystal clear that there exists a criminal law dealing 
with the theme of terrorism. Nevertheless, the aforementioned law was promulgated in 
1983, during a military government, and the objective was to prevent the action of 
insurgent groups in the country.29 It is important to underline the fact that the 1988 
Federal Constitution was precisely the culmination of a political act that marked the end 
of the military government.30 Although the military had left power in 1985, the new 
internal order was reconfigured by the 1988 Constitution, after the election of 
parliamentary representatives for this purpose. 
Indeed, there are two major groups in the debate regarding the validity or efficacy 
of Law 7170/83. The first, maintains that the crime of terrorism is already covered by 
Law 7170/83.31 For this group, Law 7170/83 is still valid or efficacious due to its having 
been ratified by the new constitutional order designed by the 1988 Federal Constitution. 
                                                 
25 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, 7. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Brazilian Federal Government, “Legislacao/Lei 7170/83.” http://www.planalto.gov.br. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Gaspari,. As Ilusoes Armadas Vol. 1 A Ditadura Envergonhada, 252. 
30 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, 7. 
31 Guilherme de Souza Nucci, Leis Penais e Processuais Comentadas [Criminal and Procedure Law 
Commented], trans. Carlos H. Oliveira de Sousa (Sao Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2008), 88. 
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According to this group’s thesis, nowadays, Brazil does have a criminal law that covers 
counter-terrorism. The second group holds that the law no longer has validity or efficacy 
due to being discordant with the principles introduced into the Brazilian legal system by 
that Constitution.32 In short, the discussion about the existence of a criminal law in Brazil 
about terrorism can be divided into two distinct doctrinal groups: the first argues that 
Brazil does have a law criminalizing terrorism, and the second states that it does not. 
The first group, led by Professor Guilherme de Souza Nucci,33 affirms that Brazil 
has a law defining the crime of terrorism, and bases its arguments as follows: this crime 
is already covered by article 15/20 of Law 7170/83. According to this position, Law 
7170/83 is totally constitutional, thus bearing full efficacy or validity.  
Regarding the second group, represented by Professor Alberto Silva Franco,34 the 
main point that supports the formulation of the theory of non-existence of such a law is as 
follows: the referred law was promulgated at the end of the time of the military 
dictatorship and its focus was on counter-revolutionary movements acting in opposition 
to the regime. Upon democratization and the establishment of a new constitutional order, 
the aforementioned law was not incorporated into the new statute after the 1988 Brazilian 
Constitution. In other words, the law no longer had efficacy or validity, given that it had 
not been accepted by the Constitution. Another major point is that the law does not define 
the crime of terrorism; it only states generic circumstances. Thus, it violates the principle 
of legality written in the 1988 Federal Brazilian Constitution.35 According to the principle 
of legality, “one cannot be punished for doing something that is not prohibited by law.”36 
Another key focus in the discussion of this issue is the Brazilian Supreme Court. 
It is currently judging a provisional arrest warrant for the purpose of extraditing a foreign 
                                                 
32 Alberto da Silva Franco, Crimes Hediondos [Heinous Crimes], trans. Carlos H. Oliveira de Sousa 
(Sao Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 1994), 132. 
33 de Souza Nucci, Leis Penais e Processuais Comentadas, 88. 
34 da Silva Franco, Crimes Hediondos, 136. 
35 Brazilian Federal Government, “Constituicao Federal de 1988.” http://www.planalto.gov.br. 
36 A. Mokhtar, “Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege: Aspects and Prospects.” Statute Law Review 
26 (2005): 41, doi:10.1093/slr/hmi005. 
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citizen.37 In this trial, one of the main points is the analysis and precise definition of the 
existence of a law regarding the crime of terrorism in Brazil. In fact, the reason for the 
extradition request was the act of committing a terrorism offense in the requesting 
country. At this point, it is important to clarify that, according to the Brazilian 
constitutional system, a request for extradition is possible only if there is a corresponding 
crime in Brazilian criminal law.38 Thus, to complete the trial, the Brazilian Supreme 
Court will have to rule on which of the understandings is to be adopted with regard to the 
existence of criminal law defining terrorism. 
Both groups have a deficiency: neither examines the law with regard to the 
principles of the international treaties signed by Brazil in recent years. Indeed, we are in 
alignment with the group that understands that Brazil does not have such a criminal law. 
Because Law 7170/83 was not incorporated into the new order created by the 1988 
Federal Constitution, it had no efficacy or validity. Moreover, assuming no criminal law 
against terrorism exists, another important discussion is required to establish the need for 
the creation of one. In a consolidated Brazilian democratic regime, balance must be 
achieved between establishing an anti-terrorism law and possible restriction of civil 
liberties.  
Indeed, the idea is to think of how to safeguard civil liberties in a scenario of 
change in the law with the aim of attempting to combat the new threats. In general, new 
laws against terrorism are perceived by some authors as undermining civil liberties and 
human rights. In this thesis, I will analyze how criminal law affects civil liberties in 
Brazil based upon comparison with the 6 selected countries.  
The six countries—Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, the USA, and the UK—
were selected because of several reasons. First, all six are democratic countries; second, 
they are closest to the Brazilian reality; third, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru are 
developing countries, have the same civil legal system, and are in South America, close 
to Brazil; and finally, the United States and the UK are the leaders in the global fight 
                                                 




against terrorism. At the end of the analysis of these countries, the focus is to describe the 
costs and benefits of the way they deal with criminal law against terrorism and how this 
affects civil liberties. Furthermore, the experiences of the six will indicate legal models 
that could lead to improvement in the Brazilian law. For this, the aim is to use the six 
countries as case studies to develop a new model for the Brazilian reality. 
It is important to emphasize that Brazil currently has a bill under debate in 
Congress.39 In fact, the bill is not already a law today because of pressure against it from 
people who represent organized civil society, and who claim that it would reduce civil 
liberties, especially the right to protest against the government.40 In summary, the 
discussion about the existence of a Brazilian terrorism law, the consequences for civil 
liberties and a model of criminal law that best fit the reality are the main points of the 
thesis. 
                                                 
39 Brazilian Senate, “PLS – Projeto de Lei do Senado, No 499 de 2013” [Senate, Bill of Law 499 
2013], trans. Carlos H. Oliveira de Sousa, 
http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_cod_mate=115549. 
40 Nivaldo Garcia, “Relator Promete Rigor em Nova Lei de Terrorismo e Nega Risco Para 
Movimentos Sociais” [Rapporteur Promises Rigor New Law of Terrorism and Denies Risk Social 




III. LAW 7170/83 – BACKGROUND 
Law 7170/83 was created in 1983,41 at which time Brazil had been governed by 
the military since a 1964 coup.42 The takeover had deposed the President, elected 
according to the constitutionally enshrined democratic laws and rules in force. Congress 
suffered the consequences, with several representatives being forced out of office. In the 
Judiciary branch of government, the same occurred in the case of two Supreme Court 
judges.43 Thomas C. Wright wrote the following about the period.44 
By 1969, by the accession of the third of Brazil’s five military presidents, 
the government had become an undisguised dictatorship using terror 
against its citizens as a means of retaining power –the model for the new 
anti-revolutionary State. 
During the dictatorship period, the military committed diverse atrocities, 
including several arrests, torture, killings, kidnappings, and disappearances of people 
(missing until today).45 Most of the opposition was shut down. Furthermore, in order to 
persecute the opponents of the regime, one of the principal instruments used was the Lei 
de Segurança Nacional [National Security Law] or Law 7170/83. This law was the legal 
face of the dictatorial system. Before Law 7170/83, the country had had several other 
legal instruments for the same purpose, such as the Decree-Laws 314/67, 510/69, and 
889/69, as well as Law 6620/78.46 
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According to Marcello Ovidio Lopes Guimaraes: 
In 1967, already under the military regime that had begun three years 
before, Decree-Law no. 314 once again defined the “Crimes contra a 
Segurança Nacional e a Ordem Politica e Social” [Crimes Against 
National Security and Political and Social Order], conceiving national 
security as an array of measures aimed at preserving external and internal 
security, including the prevention and repression of adverse psychological 
war and revolutionary or subversive war.47 
Despite the general nature of the definition, the main aim of the creation of this 
legal instrument in 1967 was to block opposition to the regime and repress the counter-
revolutionary movement that was emerging. Moreover, in this combat, torture was 
institutionalized and used methodically during interrogations.48 
In summary, during the military dictatorship, Law 7170/83 was used initially to 
block the opposition, and later to outlaw the counter-revolutionary movement. It is 
important to highlight that some acts committed by the counter-revolutionary movement 
had terrorist characteristics, including kidnapping and execution of persons contrary to 
their interests, as explained in the first chapter. These acts, however, were not on the 
scale of those practiced by representatives of the regime in power at that time.49 
After the end of the military government and the restoration of democracy in the 
country, a new political scenario was configured, featuring all the specificities of a post-
dictatorship period. The peak of this period is represented by the 1988 Constitution.50 At 
that time there was concern to establish, guarantee, and consolidate all the advances 
typical of democracy. As a means of solidifying the new democratic regime, the method 
employed was to include all the juridical assets and values to be protected in the 
Constitution. It was also a means of averting any possibility of having a government with 
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too many powers and guaranteeing that the conquests would be crystallized by being 
enshrined in the Constitution.  
Consequently, the theme of terrorism was elevated to the level of the 1988 
Federal Constitution in a very important chapter that deals with individual and collective 
rights and duties.51 
Despite the new Constitution and the democratic regime, one of the points that 
most symbolizes and represents the military government period was the aforementioned 
Lei de Segurança Nacional or Law 7170/83. Mere mention of this law arouses 
nationwide sentiment against it, given that it had served to contain, arrest, and take legal 
action against legitimate opponents of the regime and, later, members of the counter-
revolutionary movement.52 
Against this background, the law was judged to run counter to the Constitution, 
according to various scholars, a belief that was later reflected in court decisions.53 
Technically, Law 7170/83 was not well constructed because it was very open 
regarding the description of the crimes. The definition of a criminal act against national 
security was extremely broad. Almost everything could fit the condition. In this sense, 
any kind of opposition to the regime could have been configured leading to an accusation 
based on the law.  
According to Marcello Ovidio Lopes Guimarães, the problem of the Lei de 
Segurança Nacional was precisely the lack of definition of the term, terrorism:54 
The fact is, as has been repeated over the years, that the law maintained 
the expression, “practice terrorism.” when, in fact, it should have provided 
an effective definition of the crime, given that a specific wrongful action 
termed terrorism did not exist. This expression may be applied to various 
crimes, characterized by considerable damage caused to persons and 
property, from the perspective of common danger, through the real or 
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potential creation of intimidation or terror, and, furthermore, for a socio-
political purpose. 
The problem of the law, besides the lack of technical skill in its drafting, was the 
defect in terms of legitimacy found in its historical link with a political regime under 
which constitutional guarantees and civil rights were suppressed.  
But why does Brazil need an anti-terrorism law? This question gives rise to a 
variety of answers. The starting point is to analyze the international scenario and, 
afterwards, explain the commitments assumed by the country in the ambit of the 
international organs that obligate it to establish a law on this theme. 
A. INTERNATIONAL SCENARIO 
After the Cold War period, discussion regarding international security underwent 
significant change, going beyond the traditional approach based on the idea of war and 
peace among states.55 Nowadays, scholars include the theme of terrorism on the list of 
strategic threats. 
According to Professor Martin van Creveld:56 
Extensive conflict of this nature will cause existing distinctions between 
government, armed forces, and people to break down. National 
sovereignties are already being undermined by organizations that refuse to 
recognize the state’s monopoly over armed violence. Armies will be 
replaced by police-like security forces on the one hand and bands of 
ruffians on the other, not that the difference is always clear even today. 
National frontiers, that at present constitute perhaps the greatest single 
obstacle to combating low-intensity conflict, may be obliterated or else 
become meaningless as rival organizations chase each other across them. 
As frontiers go, so will territorial states. 
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B. BILL OF LAW  
Although over 26 years have elapsed since the promulgation of the 1988 
Constitution and the consequent unconstitutionality of Law 8170/83, to this day the bill 
of law regarding terrorism being debated in Congress has still not been voted. There are 
several reasons for this. One of the main ones is that described by the jurist and professor 
Marcello Ovidio Lopes Guimaraes:57 
Countries that have terrorism as a real and present problem, incessantly 
suffering the consequences of terrorist acts, and having their public 
security structures severely shaken due to this (fortunately, this does not 
occur in the case of Brazil), are more agile in their attempts to define 
terrorism and seek the type or types of crime and penalty that apply. 
The first attempt at the establishment of a criminal law occurred two days after 9/
11. The president of the republic at that time, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, determined 
that the Minister of Justice must issue firm measures to combat terrorism. Consequently, 
a preliminary bill of law was submitted to Congress to establish a new title in the Penal 
Code, the aim being to replace the Lei de Segurança Nacional. This preliminary gave rise 
to the Bill of Law no. 6.764/02, which, among other provisions, typified terrorism and 
determined penalties for its perpetrators.58 
The referred Bill of Law was subsequently appended to the other legislative 
proposal about the same matter, and it has remained under analysis by the National 
Congress until today.59 The reason discussion on this matter has not yet been concluded 
is the firm opposition from sectors linked to organized civil society. In the understanding 
of representatives of the social movements, a law that criminalizes terrorism could serve 
to prevent the population from exercising its right to protest/demonstrate.  
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C. OPPOSITION FROM CIVIL SOCIETY 
Another important factor that acts as an obstacle to approval of the Bill of Law 
499/201360 is opposition to the proposal by groups linked to the defense of civil rights. 
According to these groups’ position, a counter-terrorism law could curtail freedom of 
expression and protest against the government, thereby adversely affecting the civil rights 
reclaimed in recent years.61 
On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that clear rules are a necessity in 
every organized society. If crimes are occurring, the respective agencies will handle them 
with or without a law. The role of the law is to create stability, transparency, and control. 
Without law, the agencies work in the darkness of the lack of law. In this circumstance, it 
is clear that the reality of the facts is much more dynamic than the creation of laws and 
policies. In the current scenario in Brazil, the agencies are dealing with terrorism, but the 
legal vacuum creates a lot of instability. In fact, it also creates a situation in which two, or 
more, agencies work on the same target. The role of the law in creating stability and 
security is important to organize a country based on a strong foundation. In summary, 
with a law against terrorism, organized civil society can exercise better control over 
governmental agencies. 
D. UNITED NATIONS 
Decisions arising from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
demonstrated the path followed by member countries until the adoption of the resolutions 
that currently orient the combat of terrorism in the international ambit.62 Thus, here it is 
apt to cite the teachings of Ciro Leal M. da Cunha.63 
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In 1972, the theme of international terrorism was included for the first 
time on the UNGA agenda. The debates in that year revolved around two 
basic options: (a) juridical-normative treatment to isolate terrorism from 
the socio-political context, formulating a general abstract concept, and 
thus legislate in terms of crime with impersonal abstract rules. Such was 
the position of the western bloc, desirous of an international treaty for 
repression; and (b) a juridical-political approach to prevent terrorism by 
means of identification and elimination of its underlying causes, 
particularly colonialism and racism. This would arise from analysis of the 
international order and ways of subverting it to deal with terrorism. The 
idea was defended by the Afro-Asian group and supported by the 
communist bloc. In principle, the perspectives did not seem exclusive; 
however, whereas the first emphasized repression of terrorism, the second 
favored elimination of the causes, in particular, colonialism, a context in 
which it would be legitimate to use violence. 
From these discussions, Resolution 3034 (XXVII) was adopted, the result 
of relative convergence. The title of Resolution 33 showed the 
predominance of the juridical-political vision on that occasion. The 
document did not provide any concrete measure for repression of 
terrorism, nor did it at least condemn it. On the contrary, it focused on the 
underlying causes of terrorism and people’s right of self-determination – 
condemned colonialism and legitimized national liberation movements. It 
also established a Special Committee on Terrorism (called “Comitê dos 
35”), which, between 1973 and 1979, operated without managing to reach 
a consensus. In those years, dissension between the two approaches 
described above prevailed; the AGNU Resolutions about the theme were 
only adopted due to the Afro-Asian majority in favor of the juridical-
political focus. 
Later, according to the same author, Resolution 40/61, issued in 1985, expressed 
the following consensus within the United Nations.64 
All acts, methods and practices of terrorism, committed anywhere and by 
anyone, were unequivocally condemned and qualified as criminal. Since 
then, all the resolutions have included this unconditional repudiation, 
which demonstrates the current prevalence of the juridical-normative 
vision. This process, strengthened in the 1990s, was favored, among other 
factors, by the virtual end of decolonization, the end of the Cold War, and 
by the process of Arab-Israeli peace. AGNU Resolution 49/60 was 
paradigmatic of the change. Passed in 1994 and renewed annually, it 
included unequivocal condemnation and a call for international anti-
terrorist co-operation, without mentioning the underlying causes, not even 
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in the preamble. In fact, an original important characteristic of the AGNU 
Resolutions in the 1990s and in the post-9/11 period has been the new 
emphasis on repressive measures. Synthetically, the international 
community has shifted from a juridical-political vision of terrorism—
condescending with the scourge in particular situations, especially in 
national liberation movements—to a juridical-normative one of 
unequivocal condemnation of the phenomenon. It began to emphasize 
repressive measures and demand greater rigor in the co-operation of states 
in this respect. 
The objective of highlighting these points is to demonstrate the evolution of 
international thinking prior to the adoption of a juridical-normative vision regarding 
combat. It is noteworthy that this vision was altered after the 9/11 attacks. This position, 
however, was established by member states of the United Nations. 
Furthermore, the origin of this effort comes from the coordination of the United 
Nations in this regard. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 137365 (2001) 
guided its members to adopt laws against terrorism. Indeed, Resolution 1373 (2001) 
establishes: 
1. … all States shall: (b) Criminalize the willful provision or collection, by 
any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their 
territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts. 
According to Victor V. Ramraj:66  
First, through Security Council Resolution 1373, the Security Council has 
been said to have assumed the role of a global legislator, claiming 
authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to legislate counter-
terrorism norms at the international level (‘to restore international peace 
and security’) and requiring states to implement those norms through 
domestic legislation. 
At this point, we will focus on the treaties and conventions created by the United 
Nations—ones with which Brazil is obliged to comply—and on how the obligation to 
create a criminal law against terrorism has been established. 
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E. BRAZIL AND THE TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS 
The international anti-terrorist regime establishes norms that can be divided into 
those that are preventive and those that are repressive. The preventive norms arise from 
the sovereign equality of the states and those of repression are founded on the principle of 
avoidance of impunity for those guilty of terrorism.67 According to Ciro Leal da Cunha:68 
With regard to prevention, States must endeavor to avert attacks being 
committed against other States or nationals of these in their own 
territories, as well as curb the organization of preparative activities for 
terrorism against other territories. A list of these duties is set forth in 
AGNU Resolutions 49/60 and 51/210. 
The obligation of international co-operation lies in the duty of prevention, where, 
for example, one could mention the duty to exchange information. The duties of co-
operation are found in the partial treaties about terrorism, and likewise in all the 
consensual AGNU resolutions.69 
Concerning the norms of repression, the following are duties of the state:70 
With regard to repression of terrorism, the basic general duty of the State 
is the extradition or criminal trial of alleged terrorists in its territory (the 
aut dedere aut judicare principle). This arises from anti-terrorist treaties 
and general international law. As accessory repressive duties, States must: 
(a) typify the offences covered by treaties established under national law, 
besides establishing jurisdiction over these crimes; (b) supply information 
relating to the circumstances of the acts and the alleged terrorists; (c) 
detain suspects, according to the situation, and conduct a preliminary 
investigation of the facts; (d) provide all possible assistance to the criminal 
court process or extradition (such as the transport of the accused and 
respective evidence); and (e) report on the results of the procedures for 
repression and punishment of terrorists. 
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The need to establish a criminal law about terrorism lies among the state’s 
accessory duties in the respective combat. It is from this obligation that there arises 
Brazil’s duty to create such a criminal law. 
 21
IV. HOW DO SIX DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES DEAL WITH 
COUNTER-TERRORISM CRIMINAL LAW? 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter will analyze the approach of six countries regarding the application 
of criminal law to terrorism. The selection of the six democratic countries represents an 
attempt to show specific situations in the Americas and Europe. The focus is to show the 
legal models, backgrounds, main characteristics, and consequences of the types of laws 
adopted in the selected countries. Furthermore, it will discuss the effects on civil liberties.  
We must be conscious of just how broad in scope such a comparison is. In fact, 
it is always risky and difficult for a scholar to describe a foreign legal 
system, especially considering the existing endogenous differences among 
the various systems and the natural obstacles to faithfully capturing the 
meaning and scope of the juridical norms that emanate from another 
culture featuring distinct social values, and economic and political 
peculiarities.71  
It is important to emphasize that the counter-terrorism legislation includes some 
possibilities or amendments that allow the state to bypass its own legislation in special 
situations. After the first attack on the World Trade Center (1993) and the Oklahoma 
bombing (1995), the U.S. Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996.72 At that time, authors considered that this kind of legislation was 
responsible for “one of the worst assaults on the Constitution in decades.”73 It is 
noteworthy that these opinions were expressed in 1996, before 2001. Consequently, the 
debate about the adoption of laws against terrorism is very controversial, especially 
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because they could be used to repress public protest and otherwise affect civil liberties. 
Jonathan R. White states:74 
The controversy about antiterrorist legislation arises from concerns about 
civil liberties. The legal solution has become controversial, because some 
critics have maintained that governments have overreacted to the problem 
of terrorism. They have argued that antiterrorist legislation is based on a 
political agenda, rather than on an objective assessment of the terrorist 
threat. 
Despite such concerns and, sometimes, reactions on the part of civil liberties 
groups, the majority of democratic countries have adopted criminal laws against 
terrorism. 
At this point, it is interesting to show that, according to Lindsay Clutterbuck,75 
there are three levels of legislative focus: 
The legislation broadly focused on three levels. First, specific crimes that 
are particularly associated with terrorist have been targeted by specific 
legislation, both to prevent them from occurring and to subject the 
perpetrators to increased penalties if they are committed (e.g., the 
hijacking of commercial aircraft). Second, an increasingly diverse number 
of activities that terrorists need to engage in if they are to function have 
been newly criminalized (e.g., engaging in money raising, eliciting 
support, or openly recruiting). Third, extraordinary investigative powers 
have been given to the numerous law enforcement and other investigative 
agencies whose responsibility it is to deal with crime committed by 
terrorists. 
At this point, it is important to enter the specific terrain of the legislation in each 
of the countries, and it is worth noting the teaching of Professor Marcello Ovidio Lopes 
Guimaraes:76 
The initial idea for the combat of terrorism in the national legislation was, 
and often still is, the exclusive protection of internal order in the states. 
Thus, constantly, for such combat, the internal norm of common law penal 
figures were deemed sufficient, such as those applying to arson or 
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explosion. And certainly, therefore, following this line of reasoning, most 
of the internal legislation regarding the theme considers terrorist acts as 
infringements of common penal law with terrorist characteristics, this 
being due to the motivation of the practicing agents of criminal conduct, 
or in other words, violations of the fundamental principles of the State 
with the aim of destroying them. 
Therefore, it is also important to highlight the specific environment and 
circumstances of each country. Six nations will be analyzed regarding their legal 
mechanisms against terrorism: the UK, the USA, Peru, Argentina, and Chile, with the 
goal to devise a model for Brazil. In fact, for each nation, the legal system, the history of 
the statute (background), the law itself, and the impact on civil liberties will be analyzed. 
B. UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND 
(UK) 
The legal system in the UK is the common law.77 In this system, the decisions of 
the judges are fundamentally based on custom and judicial precedent rather than a literal 
interpretation of statutes.78 It is the opposite of the civil law system. In fact, there are 
some consequences and differences in the application of the law based on the legal 
system of the country, especially regarding the importance of the jurisprudence and 
statutes. The civil law tradition focuses on the written law, which can be interpreted by 
the courts, but always within the strict limits of the statutes. The precedents can never 
make extreme changes or innovations in the written law. The common law tradition 
privileges jurisprudence and it is also called “judge-make” law. 
Each country has specific reasons for starting to criminalize terrorism. Lindsay 
Clutterbuck stated,79 “in the UK, for example, it began with the passing into law of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act in the immediate aftermath of the IRA bomb attacks on two 
public houses in Birmingham on November 21, 1974, when 21 people were killed and 
162 injured.” 
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The historical context of the British effort to combat terrorism in Northern Ireland 
explains the evolution of the law in that country. In this step, the judgments and 
complaints from the civil society had a fundamental influence, leading to improvements 
in the rules against terrorism. According to Kent Roach,80 “The legislative nature of 
British approaches to terrorism also has meant that the courts have played a prominent 
role in reviewing both laws and executive actions taken to prevent terrorism.” 
Currently, the Law that regulates the combat of terrorism in the UK is called the 
Terrorism Act.81 It is the law that superseded other legal diplomas: Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 198982 and the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Act 1996.83 It has received several changes since it was promulgated, 
especially in the years 2001, 2005, 2006, and 2008. 
The legal model is very comprehensive. Its statute has a broad definition of 
terrorism and requires proof of political, religious, racial, or ideological cause.84 In 
addition, in the statute, one can see procedures, proscription of terrorist groups, fund-
raising, money laundering, disclosure of information, interpretation, evidence, 
investigations, police powers, officers’ powers, and miscellaneous areas.85 It was a new 
paradigm of law, “as permanent legislation that would apply throughout the United 
Kingdom.”86 
According to Kent Roach, the British commitment to legalism,87 
explains why the United Kingdom’s use of administrative, preventive, and 
investigative detention is heavily regulated by law and does not have the 
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ad hoc and extra and extralegal character of post-9/11 American 
experiments such as the initial Guantanamo detentions, immigration 
roundups, and the abuse of material witness warrants. 
The reason behind such a very large, detailed Terrorism Act was the history of 
abuses that had happened in combating terrorism in Northern Ireland since the 1970s.88 
Nowadays, after several legislative changes, the law is more appropriate for the 
combat of contemporary terrorism. The previous law (1989) defined terrorism as the use 
of violence for political ends with purpose of putting the public in fear. The 2000 
Terrorism Act defines terrorism in more detail. In essence, it includes acts of serious 
violence or threats of violence against persons or property for a political, ideological, or 
religious purpose with an overriding goal of intimidating the general public. Although the 
new law still retains a broad concept of terrorism, it is more specific, which helps to 
prevent violations of civil liberties. This improvement is the result of criticism from civil 
society and judicial review. 
The strongest points of the new law are the clear role of each actor and the 
definition of terrorism, covering a veritable spectrum (although criticized as too broad) of 
criminal offenses. By defining the role of the agencies, the law permits them to work in 
tune, preventing duplicate investigations of the same target, or even colliding 
investigations. Also, it represents savings in terms of public funds. By defining acts of 
terrorism more strictly, the law provides a greater guarantee of civil liberties, which may 
allay the concerns of human rights organizations. 
On the other hand, the weakest points of the law are: first, the administrative 
detention, which is established in fewer cases, but still exists; second, the immigration 
law, which permits a different treatment for foreigners and may represent a 
discriminatory approach; third, the use of secret evidence, which could harm the right to 
defense and due process; fourth, the stop-and-search without reasonable suspicion, which 
clearly may harm the right to privacy; fifth, the regulation of speech associated with 
terrorism, which may represent a limitation on the fundamental right to freedom of 
speech; and sixth, the special courts, which again can be considered as harmful to due 
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process and the right to a fair trial. All these points are viewed as highly restrictive of 
civil liberties. 
The most controversial police power promulgated by the 2000 Terrorism Act was 
stop-and-search. Indeed, the law allows stop-and-search without probable cause or even 
reasonable suspicion. This constitutes a real invasion of individual privacy, and may be 
intensely discriminatory, given that the police can choose whoever they want to search 
without evidence. According to the UK human rights organization Justice, stop-and-
search is:89 
The general term used to describe the power of police (and occasionally 
other officials) to search members of the public in various contexts. Under 
section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, however, a senior police officer may 
authorize a certain zone as one in which vehicles and pedestrians may be 
stopped and searched without reasonable suspicion. The purpose of 
section 44 is to enable police to carry out so-called ‘intuitive’ search for 
items ‘of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism’.  
In summary, according to the groups that protect civil liberties in the UK, there 
have been four excesses in the law against terrorism since 2000:90 
1. Indefinite detention without charge of foreign nationals if suspected of 
involvement in terrorism. 
2. Unsafe and unfair control orders imposing severe and intrusive 
prohibitions, including indefinite house arrest for up to 16 hours a day 
without charge, let alone conviction.  
3. Pre-charge detention in terrorism cases, currently allowing for 14-day 
detention without charge, the longest period of any comparable 
democracy. 
4. Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 allowing stop and search without 
suspicion, which was disproportionately used against peaceful protesters 
and ethnic minority groups. 
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Although broad, the statute reflects recent history and is completely justified by 
the series of grievous terrorist acts in the UK. Despite the criticism, the legal system in 
the UK has permitted reasonable combat against terrorism in terms of criminal 
prosecution and preventive measures to avoid attacks and arrest suspects. 
C. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Due to its UK heritage, the U.S. legal system is the common law. Since the time 
of the 13 colonies, American citizens had always thought they had the same rights as 
their English counterparts, and more—they added religious and political liberties and 
freedom of expression.91 Consequently, the common law naturally crossed the ocean and 
established roots in America. The statute related to terrorism (The USA Patriot Act) has 
to be analyzed in this legal context. 
The USA Patriot92 Act was passed by Congress in response to the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001. Despite the complexity of many of the USA Patriot Act rules and 
their impact on constitutional values, the Act was approved by Congress through an 
emergency procedure without debate or amendment worthy of mention. Although the 
document incorporated proposals that had been made prior to September 11, they 
assumed a clearly secondary role in the Congressional debate, especially since a large 
majority considered them highly detrimental to civil rights, and even brought into 
question their compatibility with the Constitution.93 
The USA Patriot Act of 2001 was an extensive, complex law that made 
substantial changes to 15 federal laws and provided extraordinary executive powers to 
operational control structures and intelligence services.94 
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According to the official version of the U.S. Department of Justice, “the Act 
Improves Our Counter-Terrorism Efforts in Several Significant Ways.” There are five 
basic lines of thought:95 
1. The Patriot Act allowed investigators to use the tools that were already 
available to investigate organized crime and drug trafficking. 
2. The Patriot Act facilitated information sharing and cooperation among 
government agencies so that they could better “connect the dots.” 
3. The Patriot Act updated the law to reflect new technologies and new 
threats. 
4. The Patriot Act increased the penalties for those who commit terrorist 
crimes. 
The Act gave federal officials greater authority to track and intercept 
communications, both for law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering purposes. It 
vests the Secretary of the Treasury with regulatory powers to combat corruption in U.S. 
financial institutions for foreign money laundering purposes. It sought to further close our 
borders to foreign terrorists and to detain and remove those within our borders. It created 
new crimes, new penalties, and new procedural efficiencies for use against domestic and 
international terrorists. Although it was not without safeguards, critics contended some of 
its provisions went too far. Although it granted many of the enhancements sought by the 
Department of Justice, others were concerned that it did not go far enough. 
According to Kent Roach:96 
The Patriot Act may have become a symbol of the United States’ 
responses to 9/11, but it was a deep misleading one. Americans on both 
the Right and the Left worried about how the Patriot Act would affect 
their privacy, while far more nasty things happened through executive 
action. These activities included the post-9/11 immigration roundup, de 
facto preventive and investigative detention under material witness 
warrants, illegal surveillance by the NSA, and executive authorization of 
harsh interrogation on the basis of the infamous torture memos.  
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Other important points include the expansion of the scope of National Security 
Letters, which are administrative subpoenas enabling investigators to review records of 
suspected foreign agents and scrutinize U.S. residents and visitors who are not alleged to 
be terrorists or spies. These investigations are not subject to judicial review unless a case 
comes to court. 
It is noteworthy that, despite several criticisms in the civil rights field, the public 
in the U.S., and in the whole world, have only paid more attention to these after the 
revelations in the files leaked by Edward Snowden. Since the first impact of the news, the 
leaks have provoked passionate debate, raising solid arguments on both sides. This issue, 
however, is not new. Since 2006, after the WikiLeaks case, the official position has been 
the same: surveillance is fundamental to protect a nation against terrorism. The Attorney 
General, Alberto Gonzalez’s defense of the NSA’s warrantless surveillance program 
summarizes the State point of view:97 
The warrantless surveillance has “been extremely helpful in protecting 
America” from terrorist attacks. However, because the program is highly 
classified, he said he could not make public examples of how terrorist 
attacks were actually disrupted by the eavesdropping. 
The same protection argument was used by President Obama in the case of the 
NSA’s metadata collection. On the other hand, most members of civil society were 
shocked by how deeply the U.S. government could invade individual privacy in the name 
of national security. In fact, Snowden’s revelations showed the apex of the role of the 
State in invading privacy. For the advocates of civil liberties, Snowden’s leaks are the 
most blatant representation of violation of the right to privacy by a government that can, 
apparently, justify anything to achieve its goals. In The New York Times, we can see a 
report covering the core concerns about the NSA program. In the words of the Federal 
Judge Leon:98 
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I cannot imagine a more ‘indiscriminate’ and ‘arbitrary’ invasion than this 
systematic and high-tech collection and retention of personal data on 
virtually every single citizen for purposes of querying and analyzing it 
without prior judicial approval. Surely, such a program infringes on ‘that 
degree of privacy’ that the founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment. 
The leaks in the U.S. have instigated a more profound debate regarding the scope 
of anti-terrorism law, and how far individual privacy should yield to the public benefit. In 
the cited episodes, civil society had the opportunity to observe that the methods 
frequently used by the State are sometimes not morally correct, and may violate personal 
privacy. Whether or not these actions can be justified by the argument of national 
security, is a question to which society has not yet totally responded. The debate 
originated with the leaks has not yet resulted in a consolidated answer, but it may imply 
future revision of the terrorism law by the courts or parliament. 
D. ARGENTINA 
The system in Argentina is the civil law, like almost all nations that have 
undergone colonization and inherited a continental European tradition. 
Until the 1990s, Argentina, like Brazil, had no previous record of international 
terrorism, though both countries had suffered acts resembling terrorism during the 
revolutionary movement in the last century.99 Later, however, Argentina suffered two 
major terrorist acts: the first, in 1992, when a car bomb was detonated at the Israeli 
Embassy, killing 29 and hurting over 250; and the second, in 1994, when a suicide 
terrorist in a car bomb drove into AMIA (Argentina-Israel Mutual Association), causing 
85 deaths and injuring more than 300 people. Thus, once again, Israelis had been targeted 
in two major terrorist acts.100 The inquiries conducted by the Argentine authorities 
concluded that officials linked to the Iranian Embassy in Argentina had participated in 
the attacks.101 
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Since that time, the Argentine authorities have been very concerned about 
terrorism, firstly, because they had not managed to avoid the attacks, and, secondly, 
because the investigations had faced a lot of problems.102 Thus, the law against terrorism 
was based on much more concrete events, and the lack of preparation prior to the first 
attacks had led the people to clamor for an antiterrorism statute. 
The statute against terrorism in Argentina was promulgated in 2007, and the Penal 
Code was reformed to criminalize money laundering as an international source of funding 
for terrorism. Furthermore, in 2011, Law 26,734 (Antiterrorism) amended article 41 of 
the Penal Code to double the penalty for acts “either in order to terrorize the population 
or in order to press the national state authorities, or foreign governments, or agents of an 
international organization to do or not to do something…”103 
The aforementioned law established a penalty of 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment, as 
well as 2 to 10 times this sentence for companies involved in transactions to collect or 
provide money for the financing of terrorist acts.104 
The Antiterrorism Law in Argentina is criticized because the statute is too broad, 
too open and could be used to qualify protests against the government as terrorist acts. 
The human rights groups also complain that the law seems like those issued in the 
dictatorship period.  
Summarizing the main ideas of the criticisms of Argentina’s Anti-Terrorism 
Law:105 
There is also a violation of the principle of proportionality because the 
sanctions are not proportional to the object of legal protection: since any 
offence could be criminalized with the double of the original punishment 
established in the law, the gravity of the terrorist act does not seem to be 
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clear. Social protests, for example, and therefore non grave offences 
committed in its occasion could be easily prosecuted as an offence with 
terrorist goals. 
As mentioned, the statute in Argentina is the consequence of serious terrorist 
attacks. It has been developing and adapting to new situations involving terrorism (e.g., 
money laundering). Although the statute seems reasonable, the broad aspects of the law 
could impair its democratic role as an instrument to guarantee stability. Lots of real life 
situations could be interpreted as terrorism, when really they are not. There have been 
recent attempts by the Argentine government to prosecute some legitimate acts of protest 
by the opposition, or even any act that is simply in disaccord with the current president’s 
view. As an example, the government tried to classify as an act of terrorism the 
declaration of bankruptcy by RR Donnelley & Sons, a subsidiary of an American 
company in Argentina, claiming that the closure of the enterprise would aggravate the 
economic crisis.106 Thus, it is important to have a clear description of the situations that 
constitute terrorist acts. 
E. CHILE 
The legal system in Chile is the civil law, like in Argentina, Peru and the rest of 
Latin America. 
In Chile, in 1984, the Anti-Terrorism Law was promulgated during the 
dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet. At that time, the government was opposed by 
protesters, some of whom had decided to resort to armed combat against the regime.107 
Furthermore, especially after democratization (1991), the law was changed to adapt to the 
new scenario.108 
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Section 1, Article 2 of Law 18314,109 promulgated in 1984, and listed terrorist 
crimes as follows: murder, injury, kidnapping (confinement, detention, and retention of a 
person as a hostage or abduction), sending explosive effects, fire, and destruction, 
offenses against public health and derailment. In the same article, the statute 
establishes:110 
As long as they occur in the following circumstances: committed with the 
intention of producing in the population, or part of it, a justified fear of 
becoming victims of crime, whether by the nature and effects of the means 
employed, or by evidence of a premeditated plan to attack a category or 
group of people, or inhibit an authority or force it to obey a demand. An 
order to produce such fear in the general public is presumed. The means 
include explosive or incendiary devices, weapons of great destructive or 
infectious substances or other means that could produce havoc, or letters, 
parcels or similar objects containing an explosive or toxic device. 
Nowadays, the law is under debate as to whether it should be modified. 
According to Paulo Molina:111 
Chile’s anti-terrorism law is at the center of a debate. This time, the legal 
legacy of the military government of Augusto Pinochet is being severely 
criticized by national groups, international agencies, and so the 
administration of President Michelle Bachelet is studying reforms. 
One of the most consistent critics of the Chilean government comes from the 
Human Rights Watch concerning its use of anti-terrorism legislation against the 
indigenous population, the Mapuche. The group claims: “The use of an antiterrorism law 
to try Mapuche accused of acts of violence violates the basic due process rights of these 
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indigenous defendants.”112 In the same way, Ben Emmerson, a United Nations 
independent expert on human rights and counter-terrorism, states:113 
The anti-terrorism law has been used in a manner that discriminates 
against the Mapuche. It has been applied in in a confused and arbitrary 
fashion that has resulted in real injustice, has undermined the right to a fair 
trial, and has been perceived as stigmatizing and de-legitimizing the 
Mapuche land claim and protests. 
Recently, a decision established, by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Organization of American States (OAS), the government of Chile used the Antiterrorism 
law unduly against the Mapuche:114 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the highest judicial body of 
the Organization of American States (OAS), reached a decision in favor of 
eight Mapuche individuals who claimed that Chile’s use of the Anti-
Terrorism Law against them violated their rights. The decision was written 
on May 29, 2014 and was later made public during the week of July 28, 
2014. The Court found that Chile’s Anti-Terrorism Law denied the eight 
Mapuche individuals a number of due process rights and ordered Chile to 
vacate their judgments against the individuals and to compensate them for 
the violations. The case was a historic victory for the Mapuche and their 
supporters who have been protesting the use of the Anti-Terrorism law 
against their people for many years. 
In fact, the Chilean law is currently under critical debate, which reflects its 
historical roots. Apparently, it no longer fulfills the requirements of contemporary 
society. At present, a bill to reform the terrorism law is before the Chilean Congress. The 
debate has been catalyzed by a wave of terrorist attacks, especially the last one, in 
September 2014, in a metro station, where thirteen people were injured. According to the 
Minister of the Interior, Rodrigo Peñailillo, the “the new law will regulate cover agents, 
wiretaps, and several legal measures that are already applied against organized crime and 
drug trafficking in the country, but not to combat terrorism, because they have not been 
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included in the current terrorism statute.”115 Hence, the new bill is an attempt to update 
the law against terrorism in a country that has developed a lot, economically and socially, 
since the end of the military regime. 
F. COLOMBIA 
The legal system in Colombia is the civil law. According to the Council on 
Foreign Relations,116 Colombia has a history of conflicts: 
Colombia has a long history of violence and unrest, including La 
Violencia, the 1948–58 civil war that claimed more than 200,000 lives. In 
the early 1960s, leftist militant groups—such as the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—
began to wage guerrilla war against the government throughout the 
countryside. After Colombia became the hub of the global cocaine trade in 
the 1980s, the violent Cali and Medellín drug cartels gained power and 
caused more havoc. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the emergence of 
rightist paramilitary forces. Known as the United Self-Defense Forces of 
Colombia, or AUC, they were backed principally by drug kingpins and 
rural business leaders. Today, the FARC, the ELN and the AUC — 
motivated by a mix of ideology, hunger for drug money, and desire for 
power—engage in terrorism and the narcotics trade, despite the U.S. aid 
package known as Plan Colombia. 
Despite the efforts and substantial changes that have occurred in Colombia in 
recent years, the law, originally promulgated as a clear response to the reality of heavy 
conflicts at that difficult time, still reflects that period. 
In Colombia, there are specific laws prohibiting the financing of terrorism (Laws 
526 and 1121).117 The main law about terrorism, however, is the Penal Code. The crimes 
related to terrorism are in the Penal Code (Law 599) in different parts, and the most 
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important points are in Articles 144, 173, 178, 343, 354.118 In fact, the description of the 
crime of terrorism is in Article 343, as follows: “That which provokes a state of anxiety 
or terror in the population or any segment thereof, in acts which endanger the life, 
physical integrity or liberty of persons or buildings or means of communication, 
transportation, processing or fluid handling or driving forces, using means capable of 
causing havoc.” In addition, in the same Penal Code, there are articles that treat the 
financing and management of financial resources related to terrorist acts, hijacking of 
aircraft, ships or any means of public transportation.119 
Another interesting aspect of the Penal Code that is important in the Colombian 
reality is Article 144, which states: “Any person who, during the course of an armed 
conflict, undertakes or orders indiscriminate or excessive acts, or targets the civilian 
population for attacks, reprisals, violence or threats for the main purpose of terrorizing 
them.”120 Indeed, it covers preliminary acts of terrorism, in the chapter about “Terrorism, 
Threats and Instigation.”121 This is a very important point, bearing in mind the reality of 
Brazil, where this is the kind of crime that has occurred, as police records of 
investigations show.122 
Although the law in Colombia reflects the reality of years of internal conflict, it is 
very interesting because it reveals several kinds of problems: domestic terrorism, 
international terrorism, narcoterrorism, fights between drug dealers, threat to the state, 
and threat to the authorities. It is a very broad law and covers a lot of crimes related to 
terrorism. 
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In the field of civil rights, there are several main problems:123 extrajudicial, 
summary, or arbitrary execution by the FARC-EP and ELN; violations of the right to life 
and personal integrity committed by security forces; arbitrary detention of human rights 
defenders; and a large number of persons registered as disappeared or missing. 
According to some scholars, Colombia is still trying to improve its system:124 
In sum, in the Colombian case, one can see a parallel and constant 
development between terrorism and counter-terrorism measures. 
Colombian law has tried to adjust to the several transformations of its 
internal armed conflicts and the respective changes in the behavior of 
terrorists. However, throughout the political and military fight against 
terrorism there have sometimes been decisions made which are considered 
detrimental to human rights. Fortunately, some institutions of the State, as 
in the case of the Constitutional Court in relation to the Anti-terrorist 
Statute, have achieved that the anti-terrorism measures respect human 
rights and constitutional principles. In this regard, the main commitment 
of the Colombian State in the global fight against terrorism is to continue 
preventing terrorist acts and suppressing terrorist organizations while 
respecting the human rights of both terrorists and non-terrorists. Thus, the 
State guarantees that it is not repeating the atrocities perpetrated by the 
terrorists who it is trying to punish. 
The law in Colombia is a byproduct of the history of violent conflict in the 
country. Similar to Colombia, Peru also has a history of severe terrorism conflict, and a 
statute regulating acts of terrorism. The law in this nation, however, has a different 
approach. 
G. PERU 
The legal system in Peru is the common law. The law against terrorism was 
promulgated in 1992, under the presidency of Alberto Fujimori. At that time, the country 
was in a bad economic phase, suffering the consequences of recent problems of 
nationalization, and the suspension of all foreign payments during the mandate of 
President Alan Garcia (1985–1990). When Fujimori started his mandate as President, in 
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1990, the economy was in decline and inflation was out of control, with prices regulated 
by the government. Despite the changes in economic policy, including inflationary 
control, under Fujimori, the economic situation in 1992 was still bad.125 Thus, the next 
step for Fujimori was to make a radical change in the regime. 
According to Jared Roy Endicott:126 
In 1992, Fujimori went on national television to announce that he was 
temporarily dissolving Congress and had passed eleven new laws by 
decree in order to combat the growing terrorist threat. In the two years 
since his election, the problem had only grown, with deadly attacks 
becoming a common occurrence in the heavily populated Lima. Fujimori’s 
Autogolpe, the Self-Coup, was backed by the military and his approach to 
fighting and prosecuting terrorism took a totalitarian turn. 
In other words, the new phase in the combat of terrorism in Peru started with the 
promulgation of the law against it because the Congress was taking too long to pass the 
same antiterrorism legislation.  
Decree Law 25475, promulgated by the Fujimori regime in 1992, is the law that 
regulates terrorism in Peru. It states the basic form of terrorism, aggravated terrorism, 
acts of collaboration, conspiracy, incitement, and advocacy of terrorism. The law also 
describes terrorism as a form of violent political act directed against a government, a 
state, a group, social organization, or entire population. 
The criticisms of the law are that the definitions of the types of crimes are too 
open, too broad, which affects the principle of legality.127 In general, there are reports of 
abuse on the part of state agents during the most intense phase of repression of terrorism. 
According to Human Rights Watch—World Report 2014:128 
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Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission estimated that almost 70,000 
people died or were subject to enforced disappearance during the 
country’s armed conflict between 1980 and 2000. Many were victims of 
atrocities by the Shining Path and other insurgent groups; others were 
victims of human rights violations by state agents. 
There is consensus in Peruvian society that a lot of crimes and abuses happened 
during the combat of terrorism, and these were committed by both parties: state agents 
and terrorists. A clear sign of this is the fact that President Fujimori, the former President, 
and his main advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, were sentenced to imprisonment.129 In 
summary, the Peruvian anti-terrorism law with its idiosyncrasy is not a model to follow. 
H. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The critique of the establishment of the counter-terrorism law can be summarized 
in the three following points, common to all six countries cited: possibility of exaggerated 
extension of state powers in the case of a critical or emergency situation, criminalization 
of social movements, and infringement of civil rights. In general, the criticisms are made 
by groups that protect human rights, and political opponents to the governments in 
power. It is important to realize, however, that a certain degree of exaggeration has taken 
place, mainly in the modifications that occurred immediately after the September 11 
attacks. 
Although there are differences among the countries’ respective laws and policies, 
in most aspects they are quite similar. The first reaction to attacks is generally the issue of 
new laws as a direct, robust response, permitting the country to react and prepare itself to 
prevent new threats. This is common among the selected countries. After the first 
reaction, normally the legislation is passed through the filter of the Judiciary, and it 
becomes more aligned with the whole legal system.  
Regarding civil liberties, the same improvement seems to occur. The first step 
after sustaining an attack reflects the need for a strong reaction, and this impacts the field 
of civil rights. After a period-of-time, under pressure from civil society and intervention 
by the Judiciary, the excesses are reduced. There will always be circumstances in which 
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the fight against terrorism will represent a high cost to society, however, including in the 
field of civil rights. 
Finally, it is important to state that only the United States has chosen the law of 
war against al-Qa’eda and associated forces. According to Jeffrey F. Addicott,130 “other 
nations have chosen to modify their existing criminal law framework to allow, for 
example, increased detention periods pending the investigation of a terrorist-related 
offense.” 
In the case of Brazil, the reality shows the necessity of a law much more on the 
lines recommended by the scholar: “The trend in many countries is for terrorism-specific 
laws that target remote acts of preparation and planning that would not be caught by 
general offences of attempts, conspiracy, or incitement.”131 Therefore, the model for 
Brazil must receive influence from the aforementioned laws, but adapted to its necessity, 
specificity, and idiosyncrasies. This is the challenge for the next chapter. 
                                                 
130 Jeffrey F. Terrorism Law Materials, Cases, Comments 7th Edition (Tucson: Lawyers and Judges 
Publishing Company, 2014), 47. 
131 Ramraj et al., eds., Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, 114. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In this conclusion, we will present the key elements of a model criminal law with 
respect to terrorism bearing the core characteristics that fit Brazilian realities. Based on 
the knowledge and experience we have been showing in this work, there are several 
characteristics that need highlighting. The criminal law should be a specific statute, 
separate from the already existing Brazilian Penal Code, bearing a strict definition of acts 
of terrorism and preliminary acts of such, and a clear definition of policy, co-ordination, 
and the role of each agency involved in the investigation and prevention of terror. 
First of all, four countries have a separate law that exclusively regulates terrorism 
(United States, UK, Chile, and Peru). Only Argentina and Colombia have incorporated 
the rules about terrorism into the Penal Code or in general criminal law. The difference is 
that, in the case of Argentina and Colombia, the rules about terrorism were inserted in the 
Penal Codes that also regulate other crimes. The six countries define terrorism in 
different ways. Some of them, such as Argentina and Peru, have a broad definition of 
terrorism. In addition, the UK law requires proof of political, religious, racial, or 
ideological cause. In the Brazilian model, there is no way to create a broad definition of 
terrorism. This is the main concern for organized civil society, and the reason that Brazil 
does not already have such a law. Regarding the USA Patriot Act, Brazil needs to adopt 
the same idea as in this model, which does not require proof of religious or political 
motives. For Brazil, the scenario is much more one of potential terrorist attacks that target 
other countries. It is similar to what happened in Argentina in 1992 and 1994 when that 
country suffered two attacks. Scholars agree that Argentina’s agencies not only failed to 
prevent the attacks, but also to investigate them.132 This is the most important case study 
for Brazil, especially because it happened in South America, in a country normally 
without problems of terrorism.  
Regarding the role of each agency that deals with terrorism, the laws of each 
country show this point very clearly. Thus, the countries designate who is to be in charge 
                                                 
132 The Times of Israel, “Argentinean Prosecutor Alleges Extensive Iranian Terror Activity in South 
America.” http://www.timesofisrael.com/prosecutor-in-1994-argentina-bombings-points-finger-at-iran/. 
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during a terrorist incident; typically, their national or local police. These detailed roles of 
each agency and their procedures are important points that fit the Brazilian model. 
Another important point in common among the six countries is clear policies and 
strategies that aim to prevent terrorism. Normally, they have a central agency 
coordinating all the efforts regarding the theme. In this field, the role of the agencies that 
deal with domestic intelligence is normally coordinated by a central agency. The critical 
points, like stop-and-search, are not necessary in a place without major risks of terrorist 
attacks. The potential restriction of civil rights is another focus of resistance to approval 
of the law. 
Furthermore, Chile, Colombia, and Peru have laws that do not fit the Brazilian 
reality. Indeed, they have all come under serious criticism from civil rights organizations. 
The only exception is one important aspect of Colombian law, that which covers 
preliminary acts of terrorism. These consist of preparing instruments and creating 
conditions to commit such crime. This is a real threat in Brazil, and the major focus of the 
investigations that have been conducted.133 It is an important point to be included in the 
Brazilian model. 
In conclusion, repeating the main points of this work, the Brazilian population and 
their representatives do not have major concerns about terrorist attacks in the country. It 
is not a priority. On the other hand, the treaties and agreements that Brazil has signed 
obligate it to have a law against terrorism. The international pressure on the country to 
have such a law, however, has not worked until now. In fact, after the announcement of 
Brazil as the host of two mega events—the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer 
Olympic Games—all actors involved in this matter had thought that these were 
opportunities to fill the gap. Moreover, the importance of the country as a global player, 
and its increased role in the global scenario, indicate a need for clear rules, and counter-
terrorism law is one of them. The reality is that, so far, the appeal of these events has not 
been sufficient to create the law. In addition, the specialists that deal with terrorism in 
                                                 
133 Veja Magazine, “Exclusivo: Documentos da CIA, FBI e PF Mostram como Age a Rede de Terror 
Islamico no Brasil.” 2011, http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/mundo/exclusivo-documentos-da-cia-fbi-e-pf-
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Brazil consider that the country needs a law against terrorism to clearly define the role of 
each agency and its responsibilities to investigate and prevent possible attacks. Indeed, 
this study shows that the law in countries like Brazil—without terrorist attacks—needs to 
focus much more on the possibility of preparing, financing, or supporting terrorist 
activities. Regarding the Bill of Rights in relation to the theme, the main reason our 
Congress has not passed such a law is the pressure from organized civil society, which 
claims that it could be detrimental to civil rights, especially the right to protest against the 
government.  
Which criminal legal model best fits Brazil? What are the main points that this 
law needs? First, it should consider the possibility of a terrorist attack. Second, it should 
present the rules for governing each organization in the fields of terrorism prevention and 
repression. Next, it should criminalize acts of preparation, planning, and support of 
terrorism. Finally, such legislation needs to avoid criminalizing acts of protest against the 
government. In summary, the law in Brazil needs a strict definition of terrorism that does 
not affect the right to demonstrate against the government. In addition, it requires a clear 
definition of the role of each agency, how evidence is to be gathered, and what the 
procedure should be in the case of an attack.  
Finally, repeating the main issue of this paper: does Brazil need a criminal 
terrorism law? We have shown that Brazil needs to fulfill the international treaties and 
agreements that actually obligate it to have a criminal law against terrorism. In addition, 
to improve its position as a global player, it needs to have a trustworthy system. Thus, 
having a law against terrorism is an important requisite. The main concern regarding the 
law is the possibility of adversely affecting civil rights. In the model, we can avoid this 
temptation and eliminate it from the law. This is the main conclusion of this work. 
Finally, we would like to conclude by citing a scholar: “to paraphrase Winston Churchill 
about democracy, the criminal law appears to be the worst way to respond to terrorism—
except for all the others that have been tried.”134 
 
                                                 
134 Ramraj et al., eds., Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, 121.  
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